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INTERNATIONAL MEGAN’S LAW AS COMPELLED SPEECH
Alexandra R. Genord*
“The bearer was convicted of a sex offense against a minor, and is a covered
sex offender pursuant to 22 United States Code Section 212b(c)(l).” Interna-
tional Megan’s Law (IML), passed in 2016, prohibits the State Department
from issuing passports to individuals convicted of a sex offense against a mi-
nor unless those passports are branded with this phrase. The federal govern-
ment’s decision to brand its citizens’ passports with this stigmatizing message
is novel and jarring, but the sole federal district court to consider a constitu-
tional challenge to the passport identifier dismissed the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claim, deeming the provision government speech. This Note ar-
gues that this passport identifier is more appropriately analyzed as a form of
compelled speech, triggering strict scrutiny review that the IML’s passport
identifier would not survive.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 8, 2016, President Barack Obama signed “International
Megan’s Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes
Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders” (“International
Megan’s Law” or IML) into law.1 In addition to several provisions securing
advance notice of international travel by convicted child sex offenders,2 the
IML requires that passports issued to covered sex offenders bear a “unique
identifier.”3 In October 2017, the State Department announced this identifier
would take the form of an endorsement, printed inside the back cover of the
passport book: “The bearer was convicted of a sex offense against a minor,
and is a covered sex offender pursuant to 22 United States Code Section
212b(c)(l).”4
Though the IML impacts a tiny fraction of the millions of U.S. citizens
applying for passports each year,5 it has produced significant real-world con-
1. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the Press Sec’y on
H.R. 515, H.R. 4188, S. 2152 (Feb. 8, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/02/08/statement-press-secretary-hr-515-hr-4188-s-2152-0 [https://perma.cc/JA45-
58Y6].
2. International Megan’s Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes
Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders, Pub. L. No. 114-119, §§ 4–6, 130
Stat. 15, 17–23 (2016) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
3. International Megan’s Law §§ 8–9.
4. Laura Koran, US Passports to Identify Convicted Child Sex Offenders, CNN (Nov. 2,
2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/02/politics/us-passports-identify-child-sex-offenders
/index.html [https://perma.cc/34WF-BT2N]; Passports and International Megan’s Law,
BUREAU CONSULAR AFF., U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en
/News/passports/passports-and-international-megans-law.html [https://perma.cc/F7MK-
63VH].
5. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-643, PASSPORT ISSUANCE: CURRENT
SITUATION RESULTS IN THOUSANDS OF PASSPORTS ISSUED TO REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS 5
(2010), https://www.gao.gov/assets/310/305432.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4XQ-DKM9] (noting
that the State Department issued passports to approximately 4,500 registered sex offenders in
fiscal year 2008, out of over sixteen million total passports issued). Of note, the State Depart-
June 2020] International Megan’s Law as Compelled Speech 1605
sequences. In the first year alone, there were 2,060 preemptive notifications
of international travel to foreign law enforcement in more than 80 countries
and 1,276 denials of entry.6 That number was expected to increase to 3,200
notifications to over 100 countries and 1,600 denials of entry in fiscal year
2019.7
Whatever the merits of the broader IML framework, the passport identi-
fier exemplifies an uneasy truth for politicians looking to pass legislation
with wide appeal: “[S]ex offenders are a great political target.”8 Perhaps un-
surprisingly, public perception of people convicted of sex offenses against
children is not only negative but also tinged with antipathy towards their
welfare. For example, 94 percent of people in a 2005 survey favored registra-
tion requirements for those convicted of child molestation, and 65 percent
were either “not at all concerned” or “not too concerned” that public regis-
tries would lead to the harassment of registered people.9 Recent studies con-
firm that the public’s “quite punitive” attitude towards sex offenders grows
even more pronounced when offenses involve older offenders and younger
victims.10 This negative sentiment can translate into termination of em-
ployment, threats and harassment, and actual physical injury to those indi-
viduals after community notification.11
Politicians at all levels of government have taken an unusually punitive
approach to postincarceration regulations on people with sex offense convic-
tions—imposing ever-stricter registration requirements,12 tightening resi-
dency and occupation restrictions,13 limiting their internet access,14 and
ment’s written response to the report argued that there was no indication that any of the thirty
individuals included in a closer case study used his passport to travel abroad in order to com-
mit a sex crime. Id. at 20.
6. S. REP. NO. 116-125, at 50 (2019).
7. Id. at 50–51.
8. Measure Would Move Some from Sex Offender List to New Registry, DAILY J. (June
19, 2006), https://www.daily-journal.com/news/state/measure-would-move-some-from-sex-
offender-list-to-new/article_0a7c8820-e40e-516c-9e2b-07b234cd24b1.html [https://perma.cc
/5BUE-774Y] (quoting Illinois State Representative John Fritchey).
9. Lydia Saad, Sex Offender Registries Are Underutilized by the Public, GALLUP (June 9,
2005), https://news.gallup.com/poll/16705/sex-offender-registries-underutilized-public.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4GDN-ZAC8].
10. Laura L. King & Jennifer J. Roberts, The Complexity of Public Attitudes Toward Sex
Crimes, 12 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 71, 84 (2017).
11. Jill S. Levenson et al., Megan’s Law and Its Impact on Community Re-Entry for Sex
Offenders, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 587, 594 (2007).
12. See Todd Spangler, Treatment of Sex Offenders Depends on Whether They’ve Chal-
lenged Rules, DET. FREE PRESS (June 7, 2018), https://www.freep.com/story/news
/local/michigan/2018/06/07/sex-offender-registry-michigan/607982002/ [https://perma.cc
/39JP-V8T4] (“Michigan . . . has created one of the toughest registries in the coun-
try . . . result[ing] in . . . more than 31,500 people . . . being placed in tier 3, with a lifetime reg-
istration requirement.”).
13. In 2014, the City of Milwaukee prohibited individuals convicted of certain sex of-
fenses “from living within 2,000 feet of any school, day care center or park”—leaving just fifty-
five residential addresses in the city where offenders can legally reside. Jen Fifield, Despite Con-
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requiring that other government-issued identification reveal the convic-
tion.15 By comparison, bills that would ease restrictions on this population
are scorned as embodying positions that “no one in their right mind could
agree with.”16
Recognizing this harsh political reality, affected individuals have turned
to the courts. In the immediate years after the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of two state-level sex offender registration schemes,17 lower
courts rejected most constitutional challenges to registry laws.18 But more
cerns, Sex Offenders Face New Restrictions, PEW (May 6, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en
/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/05/06/despite-concerns-sex-offenders-face-new-
restrictions [https://perma.cc/GUJ3-ZKEL]. Milwaukee is not unique. In 2015 alone, similar
types of residency restrictions were adopted in Wisconsin, Arkansas, Montana, Oklahoma, and
Rhode Island. Id.
14. A recently invalidated Kentucky law banned sex offenders from “social networking
websites or instant messaging or chat rooms that could be accessible to children.” Bruce
Schreiner, Judge Strikes Down Internet Restrictions for Sex Offenders, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 20,
2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/judge-strikes-down-internet-restrictions-
for-sex-offenders/ [https://perma.cc/82Y2-V6CR]. The statutory language could be read
broadly enough to include websites that are the “principal sources for knowing current events,
checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and other-
wise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.” Id.
15. In addition to the IML passport identifier provision, Alabama, Delaware, Florida,
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and West Virginia “label the applicable driver’s license, identi-
fication card, or registration card with an annotation that identifies the holder as a sex offend-
er.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-116, CONVICTED SEX OFFENDERS:
FACTORS THAT COULD AFFECT THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF DRIVER’S LICENSE-
RELATED PROCESSES TO ENCOURAGE REGISTRATION AND ENHANCE MONITORING 11–12
(2008), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08116.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY7G-AUEC]. Okla-
homa also requires a label to be placed on a sex offender’s driver’s license. Ryan Gallagher,
Court Upholds Special Sex Offender Driver’s License in Oklahoma, DMV.ORG (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.dmv.org/articles/oklahoma-sex-offender-driver-license-upheld-by-us-court
[https://perma.cc/TQ5D-P24L].
16. Aaron Gould Sheinin, Republicans Target Their Own over Bill Easing Sex Offender
Restrictions, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Feb. 21, 2014), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-
govt--politics/republicans-target-their-own-over-bill-easing-sex-offender-restrictions/aMkxzl
nO0K0Cb6YG4u7uRJ/ [https://perma.cc/J8GM-WVCH].
17. In Smith v. Doe, the Court deemed registration schemes regulatory in nature, ren-
dering constitutional ex post facto principles inapplicable. 538 U.S. 84 (2003). In Connecticut
Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the Court determined that offenders’ procedural due pro-
cess rights do not require individualized assessment of risk before registrants’ information is
disseminated to their communities. 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
18. Jules Epstein & Abigail Horn, Constitutionality of Sex Offender Registration and No-
tification Acts, in 1 THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES § 43.04 (Matthew Bender
ed., 2019) (highlighting a range of state and federal cases rejecting constitutional challenges
based on procedural due process, ex post facto, equal protection, and substantive due process
claims); see also OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING,
REGISTERING & TRACKING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
NOTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES 11 (Dec. 2016),
https://www.smart.gov/caselaw/2016-final-case-law-update-with-index-cover.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/75YY-PFPY] (“[T]he vast majority of constitutional challenges to sex offender regis-
tration and notification requirements have been unsuccessful.”).
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recent constitutional challenges to registry schemes have fared better, includ-
ing a First Amendment challenge to a law criminalizing accessing certain
websites that permit minor children to become members or create personal
pages.19 With recent successes in the judicial arena, legal challenges are likely
to continue.
This Note argues that the International Megan’s Law passport identifier
is a form of compelled speech that fails strict scrutiny. Part I summarizes the
relevant First Amendment case law on the compelled speech and govern-
ment speech doctrines. Part II identifies the major obstacle to successfully
challenging the passport identifier as compelled speech: two federal district
courts considering similar branded-identification provisions reached con-
tradictory conclusions regarding whether the compelled speech or govern-
ment speech framework applies. Part III identifies the shortcomings in lower
courts’ approaches to branded-identification provisions and argues that
compelled speech, not government speech, is the most relevant First
Amendment doctrine. Part IV then demonstrates how First Amendment in-
terests should be invoked to make a persuasive compelled speech claim.
When properly analyzed as compelled speech, the passport identifier would
fail strict scrutiny.
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE COMPELLED SPEECH AND GOVERNMENT
SPEECH DOCTRINES
The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”20 These ten words are a broad umbrella,
encompassing many related but largely self-contained concepts such as
commercial speech, the public forum, symbolic speech, and other doctrines
“colored by transcendent themes.”21 The two relevant here are the compelled
speech and government speech doctrines.
A. Compelled Speech
The compelled speech doctrine traces back to the Court’s declaration in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette that “[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official . . . can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”22 This focus on forced expressions of ideology, politics, and other
speech at the “core” of First Amendment protection was central in Barnette,
19. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that the North Caro-
lina statute impermissibly restricts sex offenders’ lawful speech, in violation of the First
Amendment).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 847,
850 (2011).
22. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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which involved a school board resolution requiring students to salute the
American flag while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.23 It remained central
in Wooley v. Maynard thirty years later, when the Court addressed the con-
stitutionality of New Hampshire’s “Live Free or Die” motto on state-issued
license plates.24
In holding both instances of challenged speech to be violations of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court’s language and analysis were
high-minded. The Barnette Court was seriously concerned about the impact
the mandatory flag salute would have on the children’s freedom of mind,25
and it identified the students’ injury as an invasion of the “sphere of intellect
and spirit” that the First Amendment is meant to “reserve from all official
control.”26 Building on that analysis, Wooley held that the First Amend-
ment’s protection for freedom of thought “includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”27 So, the Court conclud-
ed, New Hampshire’s license plate implicated an individual’s First Amend-
ment right to refuse to “foster[] public adherence to an ideological point of
view he finds unacceptable.”28
In the years after Wooley, the Court expanded the doctrine beyond ideo-
logical speech to include, in at least some circumstances, compelled factual
speech. In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,
the Court reviewed a law requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to po-
tential donors the actual percentage of funds collected in the previous twelve
months that had been turned over to charities.29 The Court acknowledged
that the factual information conveyed through mandatory disclosures might
benefit listeners and inform their decisionmaking.30 Nonetheless, the Court
concluded that compelled factual disclosures that “clearly and substantially
burden . . . protected speech” alter the content of that speech and warrant
strict scrutiny.31 The Court held the disclosure law unconstitutional on this
basis and suggested that the state itself publish professional fundraisers’ fi-
23. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626–29.
24. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
25. 319 U.S. at 637 (identifying the students’ youth as “reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source”).
26. Id. at 642.
27. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
28. Id. at 715.
29. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
30. Riley, 487 U.S. at 798.
31. Id. at 795, 798. The Court gives two examples where a government-mandated dis-
closure would burden protected speech: (1) a law requiring a speaker favoring a government
project to state at the beginning of every speech regarding that project the average cost overrun
in other, similar projects; and (2) a law requiring a speaker favoring an incumbent candidate to
disclose the candidate’s recent travel budget when making solicitations for donations. Id.
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nancial disclosure forms to communicate the desired information to the
public “without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech.”32
Not all compelled factual speech is treated equally. A speech-forcing re-
quirement might be constitutional, for example, if the mandatory factual in-
formation does not distort the content of what the speaker intended to say.33
But Riley’s expansion of the compelled speech doctrine to mandatory factual
disclosures was still an important development for the compelled speech
doctrine, and the courts continue to identify different speaker interests that
can trigger the doctrine’s protections. Since Riley, for example, the Court
struck down a state statute prohibiting the distribution of unattributed polit-
ical campaign literature, holding that an individual’s First Amendment in-
terest to remain anonymous while debating ballot measures was particularly
strong when self-identification carried a risk of retaliation or social ostraci-
zation.34 Though the Court has not outlined a comprehensive typology for
the compelled speech doctrine, it has repeatedly reaffirmed the doctrine’s
central role in First Amendment case law.35
B. Government Speech
The government necessarily speaks every day. The executive branch’s
ability to govern would be hampered without the ability to “explain, per-
suade, coerce, deplore, congratulate, implore, teach, inspire, and defend with
words.”36 Proponents of the government speech doctrine argue requiring
government speech to be viewpoint neutral would be crippling. Speech sup-
porting any government initiative would have to not only address but dis-
seminate opposing views.37 A First Amendment doctrine shielding the
government against that possibility developed with “grudging recognition”
throughout the 1990s.38
32. Id. at 800.
33. Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 364, 379 (2018)
(discussing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006),
which concerned factual speech like “ ‘[t]he U.S. Army recruiter will meet interested students
in Room 123 at 11 a.m.’ ”).
34. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
35. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2464 (2018); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376–78
(2018).
36. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380 (2001).
37. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246
(2015) (“How could a city government create a successful recycling program if officials, when
writing householders asking them to recycle cans and bottles, had to include in the letter a long
plea from the local trash disposal enterprise demanding the contrary? How could a state gov-
ernment effectively develop programs designed to encourage and provide vaccinations, if offi-
cials also had to voice the perspective of those who oppose this type of immunization?”).
38. Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmen-
tal, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 612 (2008).
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In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld a federal law prohibiting the distri-
bution of funds to entities that provided patient counseling on abortion as a
family planning option.39 The Court treated the government’s distribution
decision as a logical consequence of administering a federal program with
limited funds rather than as a form of viewpoint discrimination.40 Because
the government program merely utilized private speakers to counsel patients
according to its chosen “family planning without abortion” message and was
not meant to penalize or suppress viewpoints in favor of abortion, the First
Amendment did not demand viewpoint neutrality in the government’s allo-
cation of funds.41
It was not immediately clear that Rust established a new First Amend-
ment doctrine—although it is now generally accepted as the doctrine’s
origin,42 the Court’s opinion did not use the phrase “government speech.”43
But, as lower courts’ interpretations of the case evolved, Rust was understood
to immunize the government from free speech challenges when it spoke in a
non-viewpoint-neutral manner or when it employed private individuals to
convey a message about a federal program.44 Even as the doctrine has broad-
ened beyond challenges to government-funding decisions, lower courts have
maintained the presumption that “when the government has a message to
send, such a message need not be viewpoint-neutral, and other messages
need not receive governmental support.”45
Despite this relative consensus on the deference owed to government
speech, courts struggle to identify when the government is actually speak-
ing.46 The Court was faced head-on with this issue in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum.47 The city argued that its decision to display some privately do-
nated monuments in a public park while rejecting others was protected un-
der the government speech doctrine.48 The Court agreed with the city,
finding the decision to be protected government speech.49 Not only have
governments “long used monuments to speak to the public,” but the city also
“effectively controlled” the message sent by the monuments through its
ownership and “final approval authority” of the monuments.50
39. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
40. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001).
41. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93.
42. Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 374 (2009).
43. Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 541.
44. Id.
45. Olree, supra note 42, at 379.
46. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 36, at 1382–83.
47. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
48. Summum, 555 U.S. at 467.
49. Id. at 472.
50. Id. at 470, 473.
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Later, in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,51 a
three-factor framework for identifying government speech emerged. This
approach considers (1) a medium’s history of communicating governmental
messages, (2) the level of the public’s association between that medium of
speech and the government, and (3) the extent of the government’s control
over the message conveyed.52 Applying this framework, the Court found
specialty license plates constituted government speech because they are
“government-mandated, government-controlled, and government-issued
IDs that have traditionally been used as a medium for government speech.”53
As such, Texas did not violate the First Amendment when it rejected a spe-
cialty license-plate design submitted by the Sons of Confederate Veterans.54
And the Court arrived at an uneasy equilibrium—per Wooley, Texas could
not compel members of the group to display a license plate with a particular
ideological message on it, but neither could the group compel Texas to speak
through approval of the group’s desired design.55
Both the defenders of and challengers to different forms of branded gov-
ernment-issued identification claim victory under the First Amendment case
law. But the Court is still figuring out how these two First Amendment doc-
trines interact and what guidance to give to the lower courts hearing such
challenges.56
II. COURTS DISAGREE ABOUT WHICH FRAMEWORK APPLIES TO THE IML
PASSPORT IDENTIFIER
The IML’s passport identifier sits at the intersection of the compelled
speech and government speech doctrines. Section II.A uses the Sons of Con-
federate Veterans factors to analyze the passport identifier as government
speech. Section II.B demonstrates that the passport identifier also fits within
the compelled speech framework. But these outcomes are fundamentally in-
compatible: either the passport identifier is government speech, shielded
from First Amendment challenges, or it is compelled speech, triggering strict
scrutiny from the courts.
A. The Passport Identifier as Government Speech
The government has wide latitude in deciding what to say and how to
say it. The IML’s proponents argue that such latitude should extend to the
government’s decision to include a factual disclosure of a prior conviction in
51. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
52. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. at 2247–49.
53. Id. at 2250.
54. Id. at 2244.
55. Id. at 2252.
56. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 36, at 1380–81 (“It is only recently that the allegations
of government speech as an abridgement of the rights of others under the First Amendment
has begun to come into sharp focus.”).
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an individual’s passport. And the Sons of Confederate Veterans factors sup-
port this seemingly intuitive result.
First, the passport has a long history as a medium for government mes-
sages. Early twentieth-century passports requested that the bearer be “per-
mit[ted] safely and fairly to pass” and that the foreign country “give him all
lawful Aid and Protection.”57 At the time, the passport was simply a letter
from the Secretary of State; the passport’s bearer was treated as “a messenger,
not as the owner of the document.”58 There is also a well-established history
of passports conveying expressive messages about American ideals, values,
and history, from the images on the earliest passports of eagles or a woman
holding a battle axe, to the most recent passport’s “portraits of Americana
ranging from a clipper ship to Mount Rushmore to a long-horn cattle
drive.”59 Passport design goes beyond the purely aesthetic to “reflect[] the
breadth of America.”60
Second, a passport is strongly associated with the government. One early
twentieth-century diplomat complained that “any big official looking paper
written in English and bearing a pretentious seal will pass with many foreign
officials for a passport.”61 So the government took various measures, such as
formalizing the appearance of the State Department seal, to demonstrate the
federal government’s imprimatur.62 Modern passports bear the coat of arms
and “United States of America” across the cover, carry a message from the
Secretary of State within, and are issued only after a highly formalized appli-
cation process.63 There is no question that passports are government-issued
documents.
Third, the government has near-total control over a passport’s message.
Government officials develop each new passport design and the Secretary of
State gives final approval.64 The government also maintains control over a
passport’s contents after issuance. Even in the early twentieth century, the
marking of “one or two notes regarding foreign exchange” in an individual’s
passport was sufficient for it to be considered “mutilated,” rendering the
passport invalid.65 Today, instances of forgery, counterfeiting, mutilation, or
57. CRAIG ROBERTSON, THE PASSPORT IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF A DOCUMENT 23
(2010).
58. Id.
59. Neil MacFarquhar, Stars and Stripes, Wrapped in the Same Old Blue, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/weekinreview/29macfa.html [https://
perma.cc/SRE4-RL6K].
60. Id.
61. ROBERTSON, supra note 57, at 29.
62. Id. at 39, 42.
63. Apply in Person, BUREAU CONSULAR AFF., U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://travel.state
.gov/content/travel/en/passports/need-passport/apply-in-person.html [https://perma.cc
/V8FN-A8SE].
64. MacFarquhar, supra note 59.
65. James Blanchard, Letter to the Editor, Passport Troubles., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1931,
at 15.
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alteration can invalidate a passport and expose the perpetrator to criminal
liability.66 Bearers have no editorial control over the standardized infor-
mation that appears within the passport, including name, date and place of
birth; dates of issue and expiration; and passport number.67 Accordingly, all
three prongs of the Sons of Confederate Veterans test point to passports con-
stituting government speech.
The only federal district court to hear a First Amendment challenge to
the IML came to the same conclusion. In Doe v. Kerry, a Northern District of
California judge held that the passport identifier, like all other information
contained within a passport, is “unquestionably government speech.”68 The
court reasoned that the federal government has monopolistic control over
“every aspect of the issuance and appearance of a U.S. passport” and that,
even after issuance, passports legally remain government property.69
The Kerry court acknowledged the compelled speech doctrine and the
plaintiffs’ appeals to the Wooley, Barnette, and Riley precedents but insisted
that the passport identifier does not implicate First Amendment interests.70
Because a passport communicates information solely on behalf of the issuing
government, as is necessary for “reliable government-issued identification,”
the court maintained that the ideological or political speech at issue in cases
like Wooley was fundamentally different from the straightforward, noncon-
troversial statement of fact at issue in the IML’s passport identifier.71 This
speech, the court concluded, is more akin to the descriptive identifiers like
“name, date of birth, height, weight, or eye color” commonly placed on
forms of government-issued identification.72 As a result, there was no room
for a compelled speech challenge.
B. The Passport Identifier as Compelled Speech
Despite the intuitive appeal of the foregoing analysis, treating the IML
passport identifier as a form of compelled speech is not only logical but the
more persuasive approach. Generally, the compelled speech doctrine offers
broad protection against mandatory disclosures—the Wooley Court de-
clared, without qualification, that the First Amendment protects “both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”73 As
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (2018).
67. For an overview of which forms and documentation are necessary for a passport
bearer to change even the name that appears within her passport, see Change or Correct a Pass-
port, BUREAU CONSULAR AFF., U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://travel.state.gov
/content/travel/en/passports/apply-renew-passport/change-correct.html [https://perma.cc
/4N4N-FDFF].
68. No. 16-cv-0654-PJH, 2016 WL 5339804, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016).
69. Kerry, 2016 WL 5339804, at *16.
70. Id. at *16–18.
71. Id. at *18.
72. Id. at *18.
73. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
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Wooley itself demonstrates, the fact that speech is conveyed through a gov-
ernment-controlled medium does not by itself abrogate all claims based on
the impairment of individual speech rights. Although the doctrine has be-
come increasingly nuanced, the Court continues to affirm the basic notion
that laws compelling speech must be justified on “even more immediate and
urgent grounds” than laws compelling silence.74
A federal district court in Alabama recently agreed that branded identi-
fication fits the compelled speech framework and used the doctrine to strike
down such a requirement as unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs.75
The Doe v. Marshall plaintiffs challenged the Alabama Sex Offender Regis-
tration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA)—“one of the most
‘comprehensive, debilitating’ sex offender statutes in the country”76—and its
requirement that the driver’s licenses of individuals convicted of sex offenses
display the phrase “CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER” in bold, red letters on the
face of the card.77 Unlike in Doe v. Kerry, the Alabama court accepted the
premise that “simply because a speech act is by the government does not
mean that private speech interests cannot be implicated.”78 Largely dismiss-
ing the distinction between government speech and government-compelled
speech as “two sides of the same pancake,”79 the Marshall court concluded
that “[j]ust as Wooley applies to compelled statements of fact, it also applies
to government speech.”80 The court then borrowed a four-factor compelled
speech test from the Tenth Circuit and applied it to conclude that Alabama’s
law was impermissible.81
The IML passport identifier parallels the facts of the paradigmatic com-
pelled speech cases and the Marshall branded-identification challenge in sig-
nificant ways. Just like a state motto written on a license plate or a state-
issued warning on a driver’s license constitutes speech, the passport identifi-
er is also speech.82 Individuals with IML-compliant passports must, as a
condition of international travel and other routine activities requiring gov-
ernment-issued identification, act as “mobile billboard[s]” that convey the
government’s chosen warning.83 Like the mandatory disclosures in Riley and
74. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464
(2018) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943)).
75. Doe v. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1318–26 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
76. Doe v. Marshall, No. 2:15-CV-606-WKW, 2018 WL 1321034, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar.
14, 2018) (quoting McGuire v. Strange, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1236 (M.D. Ala. 2015)).
77. Id. at *5.
78. Id. at *13.
79. Id.
80. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1324–25.
81. See infra notes 97–99.
82. See, e.g., Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 951 (10th Cir. 2015) (“In Wooley,
the objectionable content was printed words, which the Court had no trouble finding was
speech.”).
83. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). It is tempting to conclude that the
passport identifier’s infringement on affected individuals’ First Amendment rights is less se-
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Marshall, the passport identifier conveys a factual message that the govern-
ment has adjudged relevant to a particular audience. But, as in those cases,
the factual nature of the speech at issue alone does not preclude it from First
Amendment protection.
Further, the speech inherent to the passport identifier is consequential in
a way that the speech in cases like Wooley and Riley was not, strengthening
the claim for First Amendment protection. The speech in those cases cer-
tainly impacted the speakers’ ability to choose a message that aligned with
their personal beliefs. But disclosing the fact of a prior conviction for a sex
offense against a minor creates a more immediate type of harm: not only the
intense stigma associated with such offenses but also the risk of denial of en-
try into a foreign country and perhaps physical assault and injury. The factu-
al disclosure at issue here can prompt retaliation and social ostracization.84
The lack of consensus among federal district courts as to how to treat
branded-identification provisions like the IML’s passport identifier creates
an important choice for courts hearing future challenges. Although both
frameworks appear justifiable, the passport identifier cannot simultaneously
be government speech and compelled speech—the application of these re-
spective frameworks leads to diametrically opposed conclusions.
III. THE ANALYTICAL SHORTCOMINGS IN COURTS’ CONCLUSIONS SO FAR
The two district courts that have analyzed branded-identification chal-
lenges reached incompatible outcomes: the Kerry court concluded that the
IML passport identifier is permissible government speech while the Marshall
court found that driver’s licenses, branded with functionally the same mes-
sage, constitute impermissible compelled speech. This Part argues that the
Supreme Court’s case law directs lower courts to analyze branded-
identification provisions as compelled speech. Section III.A argues that Su-
preme Court case law should be read to narrow the government speech doc-
trine’s scope, preventing its application in the branded-identification
context. Section III.B then argues that Marshall’s four-factor test is an unper-
suasive tool for identifying compelled speech.
A. Clarifying the Boundaries of the Government Speech Doctrine
The Kerry opinion exemplifies how the government speech doctrine
poses an obstacle for plaintiffs challenging statutes like the IML. This Section
vere than, say, that posed by compelled speech on a drivers’ license or license plate, which are
both more public and more frequently used. But infrequent constitutional violations are still
problematic, and passports are necessary for international travel. Though a luxury for many,
the Court has recognized the freedom of international travel as “basic in our scheme of values”
and an “important aspect of the citizen’s ‘liberty.’ ” Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 175–
76 (1978) (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1958)).
84. Cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–43 (1995) (discussing
how fear of social ostracism is a consideration the Supreme Court has offered in favor of pro-
tecting various forms of anonymous speech).
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argues, however, that the Kerry court’s analysis ignored a salient Court-
imposed limit on the government speech doctrine.
An individual who disagrees with particular instances of government
speech will typically have no recourse outside of the regular democratic pro-
cess.85 In a limited set of circumstances, however, where the government dis-
regards a statutory or constitutional limitation on its ability to speak,86 the
government’s speech is vulnerable to a legal challenge. This may be a rela-
tively narrow limitation on the scope of the government speech doctrine. But
for IML purposes, it is an important one: the Court has indicated that “the
Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the government’s speech if, for ex-
ample, the government seeks to compel private persons to convey the gov-
ernment’s speech.”87
This language offers lower courts guidance on how to approach speech-
compelling provisions that sit at the intersection of the two doctrines. Sons of
Confederate Veterans suggests that if the government compels private per-
sons to convey its chosen speech, the government forfeits the deference it is
normally afforded under the government speech doctrine. That is precisely
how the IML passport identifier provision functions. Although the govern-
ment has near-exclusive control over the passport identifier’s message, from
the time of issuance through the presentation at a port of entry, the legally
relevant speaker for purposes of constitutional analysis is the passport bear-
er. And because the passport bearer is forced to speak rather than remain si-
lent, the individual’s First Amendment rights are implicated.
1. Limiting the Scope of Government Speech: An Easier Case
Consider the following illustration of the principle that control over a
speaker’s message does not equate to ownership of the speech act itself—a
critical distinction for IML plaintiffs seeking to establish ownership of the
speech created by the IML passport identifier. Suppose the executive branch
affixes the passport identifier to a t-shirt instead of a passport. The govern-
ment designs the t-shirt’s wording and the color and font of the text—every
last detail. After receiving the necessary approvals, the t-shirts are sent out,
reading, “The wearer of this t-shirt was convicted of a sex offense against a
minor” in big letters.
Nothing up to this point offends the First Amendment. The govern-
ment’s decision to speak in this way with this message falls squarely within
the government’s discretion to “explain, persuade, . . . [and] inspire” support
85. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2245–46 (2015) (“[I]t is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a
check on government speech. . . . [M]embers of the public . . . influence the choices of a gov-
ernment that, through words and deeds, will reflect its electoral mandate.”).
86. See, e.g., id. at 2246 (“Constitutional and statutory provisions outside of the Free
Speech Clause may limit government speech.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
468 (2009) (“For example, government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.”).
87. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. at 2246.
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for its policies.88 Some might disagree with the message and be unhappy with
the government’s decision, but the Court’s decisions in Rust and Sons of
Confederate Veterans would foreclose a First Amendment challenge.89
But the government’s initial ownership of the message does not mean
that every speech act involving the t-shirt will be attributable to the govern-
ment. T-shirts are “a significant medium of communicating political ideas
and political protest” and a physical manifestation of a person’s identifica-
tion “with an entity or a cause,”90 and so can convey a constitutionally pro-
tected “core First Amendment message[].”91 An individual who voluntarily
wears the t-shirt speaks in her own right—perhaps communicating what the
government intended, but perhaps communicating an alternative message of
satire, protest, or disagreement. In either case, the government does not own
the new speech.
Crucially, the speaker’s identity changes from government to individual
even if the government compels the recipients to wear the t-shirts publicly to
convey the government’s message broadly. The government can claim re-
sponsibility for the literal message on the t-shirt but, just as when an indi-
vidual wears the shirt voluntarily, the new speech created through public
display is attributable to the wearer, not to the government.92 Whether co-
erced or voluntary, the public speech act belongs to and would not exist
without the individual—and the wearer’s ability to speak, or not, is implicat-
ed.
2. The More Difficult Cases
Cases become increasingly difficult when the government is more close-
ly associated with the medium of speech than with, say, a t-shirt. Even then,
government and private speech can be distinguished. A passport is just one
88. Nathan Murphy, Context, Not Content: Medium-Based Press Clause Restrictions on
Government Speech in the Internet Age, 7 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 26, 32 (2009).
89. As the Court has noted, “[t]he mere fact that objectors believe their money is not
being well spent ‘does not mean [that] they have a First Amendment complaint.’ ” Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997) (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline &
S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 456 (1984)).
90. Ayres v. City of Chicago, 966 F. Supp. 701, 715 (N.D. Ill. 1997). The court in this
case went so far as to say that, in a sense, “message bearing T-shirts serve the same purpose as
the pamphlet did when this country was merely a British colony.” Id. at 716 (quoting Friends
of the Viet. Veterans Mem’l v. Kennedy, 899 F. Supp. 680, 684 (D.D.C. 1995)).
91. Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City & County of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1063
(9th Cir. 1990). The t-shirt message here would likely fall under the “core First Amendment”
umbrella that encompasses political, religious, and philosophical messages. T-shirts and other
merchandise with messages affixed with “informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking
support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues” are
afforded the full protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 1064 (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 633 (1980)).
92. Masonry Bldg. Owners of Or. v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1295 (D. Or. 2019)
(“Although the Ordinance is a government-mandated script . . . the government itself is not
the speaker.”).
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example—the same issue has already arisen in the context of a public-school
uniform.93 And it is easy to imagine similar challenges that could be brought
by government employees, members of the military, individuals subject to
certain probation requirements,94 and more. But in all of these contexts, the
limits on the government speech doctrine’s scope will lead courts to arrive at
the same conclusion as the easier example: that, once the government em-
ploys an individual to convey a message on its behalf, it forfeits its protec-
tions because it is no longer performing the legally salient speech act. The
IML passport identifier and other government-mandated speech might still
survive strict scrutiny if there is a compelling government interest and the
measure is narrowly tailored. But it is critically important to recognize that a
private individual’s speech rights are implicated by such measures, even if
they pass constitutional muster.
A properly limited government speech doctrine animated the outcomes
in Wooley and Sons of Confederate Veterans. The Court concluded that pri-
vate individuals “cannot force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on
its specialty license plates,” but, in turn, “Texas cannot require [the Sons of
Confederate Veterans] to convey ‘the State’s ideological message’ ” on a li-
cense plate or any other government-issued medium.95 A government can
make non-viewpoint-neutral decisions in selecting among proposed designs
to ensure that its license plate conveys only messages that the government
wants to promote. But it cannot use government-issued media to compel
private ideological or factual speech, and the public display of a government-
endorsed message is, despite the government’s involvement, an act of private
speech.
The limitation functions similarly in the IML context. The Free Speech
Clause does not restrict the government’s decision to directly warn foreign
allies about international travel by individuals convicted of these offenses.
Nor could an individual challenge the substantive message the government
has chosen—an assessment of an individual’s intent to commit a sex offense
abroad, for example—or force the government to adopt a different message.
Those decisions fall squarely within the government speech doctrine’s pro-
93. Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing, based on the
compelled speech doctrine, that public school students’ First Amendment rights were impli-
cated by the inclusion of the motto “Tomorrow’s Leaders” on a mandatory school uniform).
94. Judges have effectuated the same type of factual disclosure mandated by the IML
passport identifier by requiring individuals with sex offense convictions to disclose those con-
victions through signs posted around their residences. See, e.g., State v. Schad, 206 P.3d 22
(Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (requiring signs on house and car); State v. Jordan, 716 So. 2d 36 (La. Ct.
App. 1998) (requiring sign in yard); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1996) (requiring
sign reading, “Warning, all children. [Defendant] is an admitted and convicted child molester.
Parents beware,” to be placed in front yard while defendant was on house arrest). Courts con-
sidering these probation conditions have typically struck them down under state sentencing
statutes without reaching any constitutional challenges. See Schad, 206 P.3d at 35; Jordan, 716
So. 2d at 41; Burdin, 924 S.W.2d at 87.
95. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015)
(quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)).
June 2020] International Megan’s Law as Compelled Speech 1619
tection. But in the same way that displaying a license plate is a private speech
act, so too is an individual’s presentment of their passport at a port of entry.
The passport holder might convey the government’s chosen message, but
that conveyance is made possible only by the individual’s decision to speak
at all. As a result, the passport holder’s First Amendment rights are implicat-
ed—the government speech doctrine is simply not an applicable defense.
B. The Marshall Court’s Inadequate Four-Factor Test for Identifying
Compelled Speech
A successful IML challenge must additionally persuade a court that the
passport identifier is compelled speech. The Marshall court’s opinion pre-
sents one avenue for doing so, through its adoption of a four-factor test for
identifying compelled speech.96 This Section examines that four-factor test
and concludes it should be abandoned, despite its use securing a favorable
outcome for IML plaintiffs.
At least two federal courts utilize a multi-factor test to determine wheth-
er the compelled speech doctrine should bar government action. The frame-
work originated in a 2015 Tenth Circuit case, Cressman v. Thompson,97 and
four years later the federal district court of Alabama explicitly applied the
Cressman factors to strike down portions of that state’s sex offender statute.98
The test analyzes whether a mandatory disclosure (1) is speech, (2) to which
a plaintiff objects, (3) that is compelled, and (4) that is readily associated
with the plaintiff.99
From the outset, a four-factor compelled speech test where two of the el-
ements are compelled speech is hard to take seriously. Once a challenged
provision clears this bare definitional threshold, the Tenth Circuit’s test re-
lies on the two other factors—whether the disclosure is readily associated
with the plaintiff, and whether the plaintiff objects to the speech at issue—to
discern meritorious claims.100 The Marshall opinion demonstrates this test’s
shortcomings. The test fails to illustrate the serious constitutional harm that
results when individuals are required to speak in the manner that branded-
identification provisions demand. Even worse, this test invites unengaging
analysis, risks skeptical courts using the latter two factors to shut out factual
compelled speech claims, and is at odds with Supreme Court case law. Mov-
ing forward, courts should not apply it.
96. Doe v. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1324 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
97. 798 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2015).
98. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1326.
99. Id. In October 2019, a federal district court in Georgia adopted a version of the
“readily associated” factor to analyze a similar compelled speech claim, distinguishing between
government speech and compelled speech “based on the facts of the case, the government
speech appeared to be endorsed by, adopted by, or, again, depending on the facts, whether the
speech is sufficiently associated with a plaintiff.” Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1376
(M.D. Ga. 2019).
100. See Cressman, 798 F.3d at 948–49.
1620 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:1603
The Marshall court’s perfunctory analysis under these two factors made
its reasoning and conclusion uncompelling. The court concluded that the
branded license’s disclosure was sufficiently associated with license carriers
because “[t]he words ‘CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER’ are about Plaintiffs,”
the licenses are “chock-full of Plaintiffs’ personal information,” and “[w]hen
people see the brand on Plaintiffs’ IDs” they direct their “dirty looks” at
them, not at the state.101 Similarly, because “even a minor disagreement with
a message is enough for constitutional purposes,”102 the court deemed the
final Cressman factor satisfied because “[p]laintiffs do not agree that they are
‘criminal sex offenders,’ ” and felt humiliated when they presented
ASORCNA-compliant licenses.103
The court’s observations as to both factors are undoubtedly true. But
noting that the contested speech here is about plaintiffs does not explain why
the speech is properly attributable to or associated with them as speakers in a
way that jeopardizes a protected speech interest. And because even speech
that is properly attributed to a speaker might not receive First Amendment
protection,104 the fourth factor functions only to filter out the weakest possi-
ble claims. Moreover, the court’s analysis does not explain the constitutional
significance of identifying a “minor disagreement” with a factually accurate
message. The court seems to conflate two distinct issues: objections to the
content of speech and objections to being forced to speak at all. At least one
Marshall plaintiff “ ‘vehemently denies’ that he is a criminal sex offender,”105
but others—in that case and in future challenges—may acknowledge that a
piece of factual speech is accurate but still wish to challenge the government-
mandated disclosure of that fact. The four-factor test offers no relief to these
plaintiffs.
Rigorously applying these factors would not make the Cressman test
more useful. In fact, it might heighten the risk that the “objects to” factor is
applied in a way that undermines factual compelled speech claims. For ex-
ample, a skeptical court might credit a plaintiff’s objection only if the chal-
lenged disclosure is factually incorrect. Doing so would increase the test’s
filtering function but would be unduly restrictive—as noted, an individual’s
objection can validly lie in the fact of compulsion itself, not only with the
compelled message’s content.106 Or a court could, in the spirit of Barnette or
Wooley, require that plaintiffs specify a political, religious, or ideological ob-
jection to the factual disclosure.107 But requiring that type of objection to fa-
cially neutral language would mean a plaintiff must identify and lodge a
101. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1326.
102. Id. at 1325 (citing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001)).
103. Id.
104. See supra Section I.A.
105. 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1325.
106. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
107. See supra Part I.
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persuasive objection to the legislature’s intended subtextual message.108 This
heightened requirement would raise the already high barriers that factual
compelled speech plaintiffs face.
Finally, the Cressman test’s “objects to” factor is incompatible with Su-
preme Court compelled speech case law. Opposition to the mandated mes-
sage might be a common feature of compelled speech claims, but it is not a
necessary one.109 The Supreme Court’s approach is predicated on the notion
that “[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make neces-
sarily alters the content of the speech.”110 In Riley, for instance, the Court’s
analysis turned on whether “a law compelling [factual information’s] disclo-
sure would clearly and substantially burden the protected speech,”111 not on
whether the speaker disputed the truth of what she was being forced to say.
The mandated disclosure might even have a desirable impact such as en-
couraging a political donation112—in which case, the compelled speaker
would presumably approve of the message. Still, such a law might be subject
to “exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”113 The Court’s precedents do not
suggest that a speaker who agrees with a compelled message is precluded
from making a compelled speech claim.
IV. BUILDING A MORE PERSUASIVE COMPELLED SPEECH CHALLENGE
Finally, this Part outlines a more persuasive compelled speech challenge
to the IML passport identifier. Section IV.A discusses various speaker inter-
ests implicated by the IML that should afford affected individuals First
Amendment protection. Section IV.B argues that, appropriately analyzed as
compelled speech, the IML passport identifier would likely fail strict scruti-
ny.
108. Identifying a political or religious objection to the factual information disclosed
through a facially neutral branded-identification provision would likely be more difficult than
in Barnette and Wooley, which both involved comparatively ideological, symbolic speech. See
supra Part I. Legislators may use branded-identification provisions to send a message that peo-
ple convicted of the targeted offenses are morally bad, are unusually dangerous, or are worthy
of condemnation; requiring an individual to identify the correct message and then to object to
it on political, religious, or other similarly ideologically based grounds would be almost prohib-
itive for compelled speech claims.
109. See Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 963–64 (10th Cir. 2015). One cited au-
thority actually undermines the Tenth Circuit’s proposition—the court’s parenthetical explains
that in Little Sisters of the Poor, it rejected a compelled speech challenge “because ‘the regula-
tions [did] not require an organization . . . to engage in speech it finds objectionable or would
not otherwise express.’ ” Id. at 963 (emphasis added) (quoting Little Sisters of the Poor v. Bur-
well, 794 F.3d 1151, 1203 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)).
110. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795.
111. Id. at 798.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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A. Identifying the Relevant Speaker Interests
Without the benefit of a neat four-factor test, the compelled speech in-
quiry will instead boil down to whether the factual disclosure mandated by
the IML passport identifier is the type of compelled speech that the First
Amendment cares about. And, as this Note’s discussion of the compelled
speech case law has demonstrated, identifying the right type of speech inter-
est is not a straightforward task. Although the Court has identified com-
pelled speech in a wide variety of circumstances, it has done a poor job ex-
explaining what the compelled speech doctrine is designed to protect
against114 and why individuals should be granted relief from some types of
mandatory factual disclosures but not others. But despite the case law’s lack
of cohesiveness and, at times, its internal contradictions,115 courts have ges-
tured toward a range of speaker interests that, when implicated by mandato-
ry speech provisions, result in the type of compelled speech that triggers
constitutional protection. Instead of relying on an overly simplistic and
counterproductive multifactor test, judges should determine whether the
passport identifier implicates the types of important speaker interests (some
previously recognized, and some novel) that are foundational to compelled
speech claims.
At a minimum, the IML passport identifier “interfere[s] with a speaker’s
autonomy”—the speaker interest that Professor Eugene Volokh argues actu-
ally motivates the Court’s paradigmatic “pure speech compulsion[]” cases
like Wooley and Barnette.116 The identifier undermines individuals’ ability to
tailor important messages regarding “statements of fact the speaker would
rather avoid” in the same way that those same individuals are able to tailor
114. The earliest compelled speech cases like Barnette and Wooley focused on the impact
that compelled speech had on the speaker’s “freedom of mind.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 714 (1977) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)); see
also supra Part I. This concern continues to echo through compelled speech cases. See, e.g.,
Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 89 (2d Cir. 2018). But the justification feels hollow: few
would argue that requiring drivers to display “Live Free or Die” on a license plate materially
influences those drivers’ beliefs. See Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech
Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 332 (2008). Compelled individuals must speak the government’s
chosen message but remain free to mentally protest against it. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 722
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A justification rooted in the listener’s freedom of mind is not any
stronger. Most people realize that the content of coerced speech is distorted and discount the
speech accordingly. See Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 152–53
(2006). The Court has also offered the alternative, somewhat conclusory observation that gov-
ernment compulsion necessarily alters speech’s content, triggering strict scrutiny. E.g., Riley,
487 U.S. at 782. But the Court does not explain its concern with content alteration in some
scenarios but not in others. Compare Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018), with Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 61–62 (2006).
115. See Volokh, supra note 33.
116. Id. at 368–70.
June 2020] International Megan’s Law as Compelled Speech 1623
their “expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement.”117 A speaker’s deci-
sion to stay silent, like a speaker’s decision to stay anonymous or tailor a
message to an audience, “may be motivated by fear of economic or official
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to pre-
serve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”118 Because those decisions are
animated by private and individualized considerations, that autonomy
should be respected.
And the harm here is more serious than the inability to tweak or tailor a
message that passport holders intended to deliver anyway—the IML passport
identifier completely strips covered individuals of the particular autonomy
of self-identification to third parties.119 At least one federal court has recog-
nized that robbing individuals of the discretion to decide how, when, and
with whom to share a critically serious piece of personal information is a
“unique affront to personal dignity.”120 Personal dignity is similarly threat-
ened here. In the absence of a mandatory disclosure, passport bearers would
likely guard information about their past criminal convictions in the same
way they would guard their medical history, sexual history and orientation,
gender identity, religious and political affiliation, disability status, income,
and other factual but deeply personal (and not otherwise easily ascertaina-
ble) information from indiscriminate disclosure. With information available
in public registries, third parties may have easier access to information about
an individual’s sex offense conviction than, in comparison, their medical his-
tory. But that does not defeat an individual’s compelled speech claim—the
relevant speaker interest is not only keeping sensitive information secret but
also the ability to refuse to disclose that information to third parties at the
government’s direction, particularly through a document designed to be re-
viewed by others.
In the IML context, an individual’s autonomy to self-identify is about
more than personal dignity. Because the criminal conviction at issue is so
stigmatizing, disclosure might carry the type of “extreme risk” associated
117. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995).
118. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995).
119. See Complaint at 27, Rogers v. Va. State Registrar, No. 1:19-cv-1149 (E.D. Va. Oct.
11, 2019), ECF No. 1 (“Plaintiffs deem the requirement of racial labeling to be . . . an invasion
of personal privacy compelling an unwanted public categorization of oneself . . . .”); Plaintiffs’
Response to Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss at 12–13, Love v. Johnson, 146 F. Supp. 3d 848
(E.D. Mich. 2015) (No. 15-cv-11834), ECF No. 26; Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expres-
sion and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 191–92 (2002) (“[S]uch compulsion
interferes with an individual’s ability to define the persona she presents to the world, depriving
her of the opportunity to control . . . her public identity by choosing what to say or what not to
say. The essence of the injury is the deprivation of the individual’s freedom to decide how she
will present herself to the world, by depriving her of the ability to control the messages she pre-
sents.” (footnote omitted)).
120. Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that the First Amend-
ment protects a prison inmate’s refusal to disclose to guards illegal activity within the prison).
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with the disclosure of inculpatory information.121 Several Doe v. Kerry plain-
tiffs alleged that disclosure would risk serious injury or death, not just denial
at a foreign port of entry.122 For example, one Kerry plaintiff alleged that the
IML passport identifier jeopardized his ability to travel to Iran to receive his
inheritance from his father, because Iran “believes in and practices the death
penalty for sex offenders,” leaving him at risk of being “killed upon entry in-
to that country if the United States . . . adds a conspicuous unique identifier
to his passport.”123 Although there may be situations where mandating dis-
closure of factual information directly to the government is necessary and
justifiable,124 the compelled speech doctrine presumptively protects an indi-
vidual’s discretion to self-identify to third parties.
Finally, courts should recognize new speaker interests that are similarly
weighty to those identified in the compelled speech case law. Speakers have
an interest in refusing to make factual disclosures that are motivated by the
government’s desire to publicly shame and to foster “disgust . . . [and] fo-
ment ostracism, banishment, and even violence.”125 The government has
ample latitude to warn necessary parties of an individual’s conviction.126 Es-
pecially given the government’s ability to convey its message through other
channels, individual speakers should not be forced to subject themselves to
public humiliation or stigmatization through their own speech acts.
The Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of community no-
tification provisions, but recognized that “notice of a criminal conviction
subjects the offender to public shame, the humiliation increasing in propor-
tion to the extent of the publicity.”127 It seemed outlandish at that time that
the government would actually implement a “scheme forcing an offender to
appear in public with some visible badge of past criminality.”128 But the IML
passport identifier does just that. Like Alabama’s driver’s license provision,
the passport identifier requirement “appear[s] to serve no other purpose
than to humiliate offenders who have already atoned for their crimes.”129
121. Id. at 91.
122. See, e.g., First Amended and Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Re-
lief at 7–8, Doe v. Kerry, No. 16-cv-0654-PJH, 2016 WL 5339804 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016),
ECF No. 31.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 740 F.3d 1032, 1034–35 (5th Cir. 2014) (upholding
the registration requirements integral to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act);
United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 877–78 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a challenge to court-
ordered completion of an IRS form for cash transactions in excess of $10,000).
125. Alexandra Stupple, Disgust, Dehumanization, and the Courts’ Response to Sex Of-
fender Legislation, 71 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 130, 134 (2014).
126. 34 U.S.C. § 21503 (2018).
127. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98–99, 105–06 (2003).
128. Id. at 99.
129. Doe v. Strange, No. 2:15-CV-606-WKW, 2016 WL 1079153, at *17 (M.D. Ala. Mar.
18, 2016) (order granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss first amended com-
plaint).
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The Court’s prior assertions that the government does not consider “the
publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part of the objective of the . . .
scheme,”130 no longer ring true, and this seeming shift in governmental pur-
pose should trigger First Amendment protection for individuals compelled
to speak.
B. Subjecting the Passport Identifier to Strict Scrutiny
Once a judge concludes that the passport identifier presents a funda-
mental threat to speaker autonomy and constitutes compelled speech, the
provision should fail under strict scrutiny analysis. The IML’s laudable goal
is to “protect children and others from sexual abuse and exploitation, includ-
ing sex trafficking and sex tourism.”131 And the passport identifier is de-
signed to work as one piece of a broader statutory scheme to achieve it.132
But while a court could reasonably conclude that the animating gov-
ernment interest is sufficiently compelling,133 the passport identifier provi-
sion is not narrowly tailored—either in the scope of individuals affected or in
the government’s method of conveying the selected message. The passport
identifier provision applies to “covered sex offenders.”134 This label encom-
passes a diverse group of people with convictions for a wide range of offens-
es.135 The sole unifying feature is that all covered individuals are required to
register under their home jurisdiction’s sex offender registration programs
for an “offense against a minor.”136
The passport identifier uses an individual’s previous conviction for a sex
offense against a minor, broadly defined, as a proxy for future risk to chil-
130. Smith, 538 U.S. at 99. The Smith Court’s conclusion that state registry schemes are
not punitive rested, in part, on this basis. Id. at 97–99. See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING
FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 153, 175, 194−96 (2004) (describing
“shame penalties” and proponents’ belief that public branding “vividly and surely expresses
society’s disapproval of the offender”).
131. International Megan’s Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes
Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders, Pub. L. No. 114-119, 130 Stat. 15
(2016) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2250 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
132. See 162 CONG. REC. H387, H390 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2016) (statement of Rep. Smith);
Press Release, Richard Shelby, U.S. Senator for Ala., Shelby Introduces International Megan’s
Law to Prevent Child Exploitation (July 27, 2015), https://www.shelby.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm/2015/7/shelby-introduces-international-megan-s-law-to-prevent-child-exploita
tion [https://perma.cc/5HUJ-HMRF].
133. Doe v. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1326 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
134. International Megan’s Law § 8.
135. Daniel Cull, Note, International Megan’s Law and the Identifier Provision—An Effi-
cacy Analysis, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 181, 195–99 (2018); see generally Q&A:
Raised on the Registry, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 1, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news
/2013/05/01/qa-raised-registry# [https://perma.cc/MBT8-RBNM] (noting that public registra-
tion laws can apply to those “who have committed any of a wide range of sex offenses, from the
very serious, like rape, to the relatively innocuous, such as public nudity”).
136. 22 U.S.C. § 212b(c)(1) (2018); 34 U.S.C. § 21503(f) (2018). See also Cull, supra note
135, at 195.
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dren overseas. But actual evidence supporting the predictive power of these
types of prior convictions is limited. A recent global study on child sexual
exploitation concluded that there is “no such thing as a ‘typical’ offender”—
there are “ ‘situational’ offenders, who travel with no intention of abusing a
child” but nonetheless do so in environments where the sexual exploitation
of children has been normalized and carries little risk of consequences.137
And people convicted of sexual offenses have low rates of reoffending. In
nearly 96 percent of sex offenses, the perpetrator is a first-time offender.138
The passport identifier provision sweeps well beyond the subset of individu-
als who might pose an actual threat to children overseas.
Further, a plain text declaration of the individual’s prior conviction is in
no way a narrowly tailored method of conveying the government’s chosen
message. The law’s supporters argue that the passport identifier provides a
backstop in situations where the individual fails to report international travel
or the government fails to send timely notification abroad.139 But there are
alternative ways to convey that message without requiring an individual to
disclose their convictions to any person who views their passport. After the
Marshall court struck down the analogous Alabama driver’s license provi-
sion, for example, the state modified compliant licenses to instead display a
series of numbers and letters—the meaning of which would be known only
to law enforcement.140 An even more discreet and effective alternative would
137. ANGELA HAWKE & ALISON RAPHAEL, OFFENDERS ON THE MOVE: GLOBAL STUDY ON
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN TRAVEL AND TOURISM 53 (2016),
https://www.ecpat.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Offenders-on-the-move-Global-Study-
on-the-Sexual-Exploitation-of-Children-in-Travel-and-Tourism.pdf [https://perma.cc/A78R-
RUC3]; see also Katie Weiner, The Trouble with Tourists, HARV. POL. REV. (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://harvardpolitics.com/world/tourism-sexual-exploitation-of-children/ [https://perma.cc
/TXU5-5V3L] (“[T]he study found that the majority of perpetrators do not travel with the in-
tention or sole purpose of committing these crimes. . . . Empowered by a sense of anonymity
and impunity, perpetrators who would not necessarily exploit children under normal circum-
stances commit acts of sexual violence while traveling.”).
138. Guy Hamilton-Smith, We’re Putting Sex Offender Stamps on Passports. Here’s Why
It Won’t Curb Sex Tourism & Trafficking., APPEAL (Nov. 9, 2017), https://theappeal.org/were-
putting-sex-offender-stamps-on-passports-heres-why-it-wont-curb-sex-tourism-trafficking/
[https://perma.cc/MDZ8-PW4N]. Similarly, a recent California Corrections Department re-
port found that only 0.8 percent of registered sex offenders who returned to prison after release
did so due to the individual committing another sex crime—instead, close to 92 percent of
those who returned to prison did so because of a parole violation. Anat Rubin, This Is What
Happens to Registered Sex Offenders on Halloween, MIC (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.mic.com
/articles/127414/this-is-what-happens-to-registered-sex-offenders-on-halloween [https://
perma.cc/9HCZ-FJJ2].
139. See supra note 132.
140. In a motion to amend or alter the judgment, Alabama state officials noted that the
court had suggested that a sex offender designation of just a letter or a reference to a statute, as
the designation appears in Delaware and in Florida, respectively, might be narrowly tailored.
Defendants’ Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment at 4–5, Doe v. Marshall, No. 2:15-CV-606-
WKW (M.D. Ala. Mar. 15, 2019), 2019 WL 3369551. The filing explains that the new designa-
tion for ASORCNA-compliant licenses will be a combination of letters and numbers that will
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be to include information about an individual’s conviction in the Radio Fre-
quency Identification (RFID) chip, which is already used to carry infor-
mation such as the passport bearer’s name, date and place of birth, other
biographical information, and a biometric identifier.141 Precisely the same
message would be shared with foreign border officials. But the individual
would be able to convey it in a way that minimizes the risk of inadvertent
disclosure to those who have no right or need to know the information.142
CONCLUSION
When the IML was signed into law, a handful of observers saw it for
what it was: bad policy. The sole representative to object to the passport
identifier during congressional debate worried that the provision could lead
to unintended consequences, including persecution and the risk of bodily
harm.143 Others denounced the IML’s provision as “vindictive and petty”
and “premised on a profound and consequential misunderstanding of how
sex crimes against minors are usually perpetrated.”144
This criticism of the passport identifier as policy is valid and important.
But this Note argues further that the passport identifier is unconstitutional
compelled speech. The government cannot validly claim that the passport
identifier is owed the protection that courts normally afford to government
speech. By conscripting passport-bearing Americans into warning others
about their own prior convictions on the United States’ behalf, the govern-
ment has run afoul of the Constitution.145 The compelled speech doctrine
protects passport holders who suffer this egregious violation to their speaker
autonomy, particularly in light of the serious—even deadly—ramifications of
the factual speech the passport identifier compels.
appear in the same color and font as other identifying information. Id.; see also Doe v. Mar-
shall, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
141. E-Passport: All About the Electronic Passport, U.S. PASSPORT SERV. GUIDE,
https://www.us-passport-service-guide.com/e-passport.html [https://perma.cc/9QLM-M5RU].
142. RFID – Radio Frequency Identification Chips in U.S. Passports, U.S. PASSPORT SERV.
GUIDE, https://www.us-passport-service-guide.com/rfid-radio-frequency-identification-
chip.html [https://perma.cc/P8R7-99C8] (noting that the RFID technology embedded in pass-
ports does not include any personally identifying information, suggesting that the information
regarding an individual’s conviction could be associated with a unique number tied to a record
in a secure government database rather than with the individual’s name or other personally
identifying information).
143. 162 CONG. REC. H393 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2016) (statement of Rep. Scott).
144. Leon Neyfakh, Obama Just Signed a Really Bad Criminal Justice Law, SLATE (Feb. 9,
2016, 3:20 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/02/the-international-megans-law-
obama-just-signed-is-bad-law.html [https://perma.cc/6FMZ-JH3D]; Jacob Sullum, Scarlet Let-
ter Passports Are Unjust and Irrational, CHI. SUN TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017, 12:56 PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/sullum-scarlet-letter-passports-are-unjust-and-
irrational/ [https://perma.cc/2UVT-5C33].
145. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246
(2015).
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The compelled speech doctrine might not threaten federal and state
governments’ use of sex offense registries altogether.146 But law enforcement
officers, judges, and politicians at all levels of government continue to find
innovative ways to force individuals to publicly disclose prior convictions
(for sex offenses and other criminal conduct) under the guise of public safe-
ty.147 And not just those with criminal convictions are at risk—it is an unfor-
tunate fact of American history that legislatures have tried to use the shame
or danger associated with mandatory public factual disclosures to discourage
the exercise of certain constitutional rights, like receiving an abortion148 or
engaging in other socially unpopular conduct.149 If the government speech
doctrine is not narrowly construed, such measures could escape constitu-
tional scrutiny so long as the disclosures are made through government-
controlled media. It is important, therefore, that courts recognize these
measures for what they are and subject them to appropriately searching judi-
cial scrutiny.
146. See supra note 124.
147. In 2018, for example, a county sheriff placed signs reading, “Warning! No trick-or-
treat at this address!! A community safety message from Butts County Sheriff Gary Long,” in
offenders’ yards. Aris Folley, Sheriff’s Office Posts Signs in Yards of Registered Sex Offenders for
Halloween, HILL (Oct. 31, 2018, 2:28 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/414113-sheriffs-office-posts-signs-in-yards-of-registered-sex [https://perma.cc
/WCL2-ZBCL]. In 2019, several affected individuals filed a putative class action that included
First Amendment compelled speech claims. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief
and Damages at 14–15, Reed v. Long, No. 5:19-cv-385-MTT (M.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2019). Using a
slightly different test from the Marshall court, the district court determined that the plaintiffs
had a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their First Amendment compelled
speech claims and granted a preliminary injunction. Reed v. Long, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (M.D.
Ga. 2019). For a history and multistate discussion of probation conditions mandating individ-
uals to make public factual disclosures, see Phaedra Athena O’Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ide-
ology of Shame: An Analysis of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-
Letter Probation Conditions, 77 N.C. L. REV. 783 (1999).
148. The Pennsylvania legislature enacted a reporting requirement that obligated physi-
cians performing abortions after the first trimester to file a report with detailed information
about the woman seeking the abortion, like state of residence, age, race, marital status, number
of prior pregnancies, date of last menstrual period and probable gestational age, and method of
payment for the abortion. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 765–69 (1986). The report also had to include the basis for a finding of nonviability or
medical emergency. Id. at 765. Most egregiously, the reports were available for public inspec-
tion and copying for more than two weeks, and there were no statutory restrictions on how
those reports could be used. Id. at 766.
149. Florida’s 2001 Adoption Act required pregnant women or adoption agencies to give
constructive notice to a child’s biological father before a pending adoption was finalized, even
if the identity and location of the biological father was unknown. Claire L. McKenna, Note, To
Unknown Male: Notice of Plan for Adoption in the Florida 2001 Adoption Act, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 789, 792 (2004). Women were required to place weekly ads in a newspaper in every
county where conception could have occurred with a physical description of the expectant
woman’s age, race, hair and eye color, and approximate height and weight, along with a similar
description of any person reasonably believed to be the father. Id. The ad also had to include
any date and any city in which conception may have occurred. Id.
